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ABSTRACT
Economic development has evolved since the Great Depression era in the
United States from a stance of pure “smokestack chasing” to a more diverse set
of strategies aimed at business retention and expansion. One method that has
been successfully used domestically and internationally is the use of microloans
to finance small businesses. One major component of microfinance strategies
used abroad that allows for lower transaction costs is the use of Peer Group
Lending Programs (PGLPs). This paper first reviews the cited social, political,
and financial reasons for the lack of such programs in U.S. microfinance
initiatives. It simultaneously addresses why these American characteristics may
not be as limiting as touted to be and proposes a hypothesis that certain groups
may be well aligned to take advantage of a PGLP financing mechanism.
Beginning farmers associated with farm incubators are targeted as a group for
such consideration due to their affiliation with a local food system, the expected
social cohesion among them, and their likely need for alternative means of
financing. This hypothesis is tested with a survey of such farmers and analysis of
their responses. The results indicate that there is some support for PGLPs
amongst incubator farmers. Based on the survey responses, those who are
heavily reliant upon farmers and mentors only within their incubator and those
that are willing to borrow from other sources represent the most promising
targets of a successful PGLP financing strategy.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The desire for economic development is not limited to developing
countries. In the United States, agencies at every level of government, as well as
a host of independent organizations and university centers, are devoted to the
subject. In the midst of a recession that has lasted nearly five years, cities and
states across the nation are now especially focused on developing strategies to
increase employment and economic activity within their jurisdictions. Since the
Great Depression era, there has been a focus in U.S. policy on attracting large
companies from other locations via incentives such as tax abatements,
subsidies, and low-rent land. Starting in the late 1970s with the decline of federal
funding for local economic development programs, states and municipalities
have begun shifting their focus from competitive first wave economic
development approaches, often referred to as “smokestack chasing”, to a
broader range of strategies aimed at business retention and expansion (Eisinger,
1988, Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999, Shaffer and Marcouiller, 2006). One method
that has been successfully used outside of the United States is the use of
microloans to finance small businesses. The microloan finance strategy was
pioneered in the mid-1970s in Bangladesh by Professor Muhammad Yunus and
has since grown to be implemented in over 100 countries (MixMarket.org, 2012).
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Critical to the success of microfinance and Yunus’ award of the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2006 has been the innovative use of peer group lending programs
(PGLPs). PGLPs rely on peer influence by a group of self-selected individuals to
encourage loan repayment. The group members are also often held responsible
for defaults by their peers. This shared responsibility leads to an effective
selection of reliable borrowers in a market without credit histories and collateral
on which to rely. The group members’ willingness to “back” their peers also
reduces lender risks and costs. Knowledge embedded in social relationships
serves a similar function as more bureaucratic routines like credit checks do in
the developed world. However, since microfinance’s debut in America in the late
1970s, the use of PGLPs by U.S. microfinance institutions (MFIs) has greatly
decreased, and they are rarely used today. Based on a 2010 survey, only 6% of
respondent MFIs offered a PGLP strategy (FIELD, 2008 and 2012a).
This research begins with a review of the literature on microlending in the
United States. In particular, it explores the reasons for minimal use of PGLPs in
the U.S. and how that limits the effectiveness and sustainability of U.S. MFIs.
Crucial to this exploration is the effect of social capital on the reliance on PGLPs.
Thus, a discussion of social capital literature follows. Based on this knowledge,
this paper argues that there is an unrecognized opportunity to identify U.S.
markets in which social capital exists such that PGLPs can be incorporated. The
proposal identifies local food systems as such a market, based on their reliance
on local farmers who often interact with and rely upon each other for various
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services and product fulfillment and regularly interact with their clients. It then
outlines a research project designed to test the possibility of using peer group
lending programs, in conjunction with other training and business development
services, in the U.S. The chosen market for this study consists of small farmers,
particularly those already invested in local food systems, as identified by
participation in a farm incubator. The project involved preliminary conversations
with farmers and farm incubator staff to identify and refine crucial issues to this
inquiry. Once that framework was established, a survey frame was developed
using member lists of farm incubators, and a survey was created and conducted
via an internet application to garner farm incubator participant perspectives on
the subject. Each set of questions is summarized to provide a basic
understanding of the respondents, their farm incubation participation, and the
challenges and opportunities they identified. (See Appendix C for a full set of
summary charts and statistics). Particular relationships are subsequently
analyzed using Fisher’s exact tests, simple logistic regressions, and linear
probability models. This analysis aims to answer the following question: Do
farmers associated with farm incubators offer a market for the application of a
PGLP microfinance model?
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Microfinance
Origins
Microfinance is a concept centered on one primary tool, microlending. In
his book Banker to the Poor, Muhammad Yunus (2007) explains the journey that
led him to start a microlending enterprise in 1976, now known internationally as
the Grameen Bank. One may recognize the name of the bank as the winner of
the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. This largely successful strategy for poverty
alleviation started when Yunus was shocked to witness the seemingly inevitable
cycle of poverty experienced by the incredibly industrious village women in
Jobra, Bangladesh. After speaking with one such woman, Sufiya Begum, a stoolmaker in Jobra, he discovered that she was unable to purchase the bamboo
necessary to make her stools for a lack of twenty-two cents. Sufiya acquired the
capital needed through a trader (or “middleman”) that would later pay about
twenty-four cents for a finished stool, lending Sufiya a daily profit of only two
cents. The small amount of profit was just enough to provide food and shelter for
her family, and served as a better alternative to facing the usurious rates charged
by local moneylenders. Yunus (2007) recognized that “the existing economic
system made it absolutely certain that Sufiya’s income would be kept perpetually
at such a low level that she would never save a penny and would never invest in
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expanding her economic base” (p. 48). After a week of collecting information on
other villagers in Jobra, Yunus’s assistant discovered forty-two borrowers reliant
on the traders for a total of only twenty-seven dollars.
From such a small amount of money was born a big idea. Yunus (2007)
realized that the biggest barrier to escaping poverty for these hard-working
entrepreneurs was an inability to borrow at a reasonable interest rate. That
incapacity stemmed from their lack of assets to use as collateral in order to
secure a loan at a commercial bank. The problem represented a case of the
chicken or the egg; which would come first to produce the other? Yunus’ solution
hatched from creatively reimagining the “rules” by which the poorest of the poor
could borrow and establish credit. Micro-loans were awarded to the “poorest” in
this manner first in Bangladesh and increasingly in other parts of the world
following the newly established Grameen model. The term “poorest” was defined
in 1995 by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest and the Microcredit
Summit Campaign Committee as the bottom fifty percent of those below the
poverty level and distinguished from the “poor” who were normally defined as all
individuals below the poverty level (Yunus, 2007, p. 41).
The original model consisted of making very small loans to those able to
form a peer group of five individuals in similar situations. The peer group was
used as a means of screening and monitoring members since each person was
held accountable for defaults from any other group member. Such an
arrangement reduced the moral hazard that might arise from lending to one’s
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peers by decreasing the group’s willingness to approve loans for which they
would likely be held accountable for repaying. Another problem inherent to
lending is adverse selection which is typically addressed by banks with higher
interest rates, though this prevents lower income individuals from gaining access
to such loans. The peer group framework helped guard against adverse selection
through the reliance on greater personal knowledge about each individual
borrower and his/her preferred behaviors and propensity for risk-taking. The
concept of peer group lending programs (PGLPs) was central to the new
mechanism referred to as microlending. Yunus (2007) reasoned that using peer
pressure in conjunction with the fact that the practically asset-less borrowers had
no better alternative for improving their qualities of life would be enough to
encourage repayment. He was right.
The reported repayment rate as of August 2012 for the Grameen bank
stood at 96.88% (Grameen Bank, 2012). This and other reported microloan
repayment rates averaging between 95% and 98% are remarkable compared to
the average repayment rates for other types of credit offered in the U.S., such as
consumer credit, consumer loans, and mortgage/housing loans (Grameen
Foundation, 2012; Euromonitor International, 2011). As one can see in Figure 1,
the rates for microlending and other types of credit used to be comparable, but
the latter have fallen greatly due to the recession. It is important to note that the
average microlending repayment rates are based on those reported to
Mixmarket.org, an online microfinance database which contains no data from
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U.S. MFIs. Consumer credit has traditionally suffered the lowest repayment rates
compared to other loans in the U.S., likely due in part to the high interest rates
charged on consumer credit cards. Repayment rates for small business loans in
the nation are not reported annually, though a 2009 CNNMoney.com report
pinned them at 91.6% and 88.1% in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Again, these
rates were reported during the recession, yet still fell much below average
microloan rates. Additionally, Bloomberg.com (2010) reported that small
business loan defaults range from 4% to 14% for the nation’s largest lenders.
100
Repayment Rates

98

Consumer Lending

96
Mortgages/Housing

94
92

Consumer Credit

90
Microloans (for
select regions)

88
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Figure 1: Average Loan Repayment Rates
Source: Euromonitor International (2011) and Mixmarket.org (2012)

United States Applications
After seeing the international success of microlending strategies, it was
only a matter of time before the United States adopted this practice as a tool to
enhance entrepreneurship and reduce poverty. Around the same time
Muhammad Yunus was developing the concept of microlending in Bangladesh,
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several groups in the United States were already creating institutions with similar
goals. ShoreBank Corporation was founded in 1973 in Chicago to serve the
underbanked (those typically excluded from mainstream banking for various
reasons discussed in greater detail below) in the city’s South Shore area. The
organization served to advance inclusionary financing with multiple branches in
several states for 37 years before closing in August 2010 after facing a shortage
of capital during the “great recession” (Post & Wilson, 2011). Although the
ShoreBank Corporation differed greatly from the Grameen Bank, it signified an
understanding that financial exclusion was a real problem within the United
States. As awareness about the field grew, so too did the number of microfinance
institutions in the United States. According to the Opportunity Fund’s
“Microlending in the United States: A Timeline History, 1973-2010”, 1981 marked
a milestone for garnering national attention with segments on Oprah and 60
Minutes about a microloan program for women based out of St. Paul Minnesota.
By the late 1980s, awareness and support of microfinance was firmly established
in the U.S. (Opportunity Fund, 2010).
The Aspen Institute’s Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness,
Learning and Dissemination, referred to in this document as FIELD (2010, 2012),
estimates that the number of microenterprise development programs in the U.S.
has continued its upward trend, growing from 84 in 1992 to 854 today. With
increased numbers has come enormous variety in microfinance models, and
today many U.S. microfinance organizations are quite different from the
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Grameen Bank. The two primary differences have been the relative lack of peer
group lending strategies and the inclusion of business development services or
other training programs offered by United States enterprises. Since the
introduction of the Good Faith Fund in Arkansas (one of the first Grameen-style
MFIs in the U.S.), attempts to use PGLPs in the U.S. context have been met with
mixed reviews (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008, p. 16).
Research on microfinance practice in the U.S. shows this lack of PGLPs
to be widespread. For instance, Hung (2003) noted that the Aspen Institute
reported 53 PGLPs in their 1996 Directory of Microenterprise Programs. Since
then, that number has declined according to FIELD’s U.S. Microfinance Census,
conducted in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, 15 out of 141 microenterprise
development programs (reporting their lending methodologies) offered peer or
group-based loans in addition to individual loans. In 2010 the number of
programs reporting peer group lending stayed at 15, while the total number of
programs increased 67% to 235 as seen in Figure 2. Additionally, 1 program
(.7%) reported sole reliance on peer loans in 2008 compared to 6 such programs
(2.5%) in 2010. FIELD also reports that the number of programs providing
business development services has increased from 72% (266 out of 369
reporting) in 2008 to 97% (356 out of 366) in 2010. These statistics support the
notion that “the earliest U.S. programs started with loans, but now focus on
training” (Schreiner and Woller, 2003, p. 1574).
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This shift from lending to business development services leads one to
question how microfinance can exist when loans are limited. Edgcomb, Klein,
and Clark (1996) report that a majority of microenterprise development
organizations offer solely technical assistance to a large amount of their clients.
This

perhaps

explains

their

reference

to

microenterprise

development

organizations as opposed to microfinance institutions (MFIs). The similarity in
terms is indicative of the blurred distinction in the U.S. between microfinance and
more general support for microenterprise and small business. This research is
concerned with the former, whether or not it provides the additional services that
the latter do.
250

200

150
Total
PGLPs

100

50

0
2008

2010

Figure 2: U.S. PGLPs Compared to Total U.S. Microenterprise Development Programs
Source: U.S. Microfinance Census (2008, 2010)
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Obstacles to U.S. Implementation
Microfinance programs in the United States operate in a much different
context than those in Bangladesh, India, or Latin America. Similar to most other
economic development strategies, microfinance models must be adapted to fit
the inherent political, social, and economic environments in which they are
immersed. Unfortunately, many microfinance programs have been implemented
in the U.S. without first acknowledging that such changes needed to be made. As
cited by Morduch (2000), Hulme and Mosley (1996, p. 135) state:
Ironically, it is the success of the “first wave” finance-for-the-poor
schemes, and particularly the Grameen Bank, that is the greatest obstacle
to future experimentation. Most designers and sponsors of new initiatives
have abandoned innovation, and “replication” is leading to a growing
uniformity in financial interventions. (p. 627).
It appears as though American microfinance programs have been the result of
selective replication rather than innovation. Through this process, the primary
component of microfinance (the use of PGLPs) has been removed, and U.S.
MFIs have reverted to simply small business development. As such, over the
past 30+ years the challenges listed in Table 1 have been identified as barriers to
effective implementation in the U.S.
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Challenge (as compared to
lesser developed countries)

It is much easier to access
alternative forms of credit in
the U.S.
The relative size of the
market for microenterprises
in the U.S. is small.
Competition from large scale
producers and distributors
is greater in the U.S.
There are many more
enforced regulations in the
United States.
It is just as difficult, if not
more so, to obtain financial
self-sufficiency for U.S.
MFIs.

Cited by:
Schreiner and Morduch, 2001, Hung, 2001
Schreiner and Woller, 2003, Schreiner and
Morduch, 2001, Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark,
1996
Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008, Schreiner
and Woller, 2003, Schreiner and Morduch,
2001
Buckland and Hay, 2012, Yunus, 2003,
Schreiner and Woller, 2003, Schreiner and
Morduch, 2001, Bhatt and Tang, 1998
Buckland and Hay, 2012, Quayes, 2012,
Counts, 2008, Sengupta and Aubuchon,
2008, Servon, 2006, Buckley, 2001, Bhatt,
Tang, and Painter, 2001, Schreiner and
Morduch, 2001, Bhatt and Tang, 1998

Table 1: Challenges to U.S. Microfinance and Supporting Authors

These challenges are reviewed in turn below. They are divided into two
groups of thought. The first three challenges listed in Table 1 fall into the “we
don’t need microfinance in the U.S.” category while the final two obstacles fit the
“it won’t work here” mentality. After challenges in the first group are each
explained and disputed, the second group is addressed with attention drawn to
the inapplicability of these arguments due to their exclusion of PGLPs in their
definition of microfinance, leading to critiques of programs that are something
else entirely. Finally, the literature addressing the inability to implement peer
group lending programs in the U.S. is reviewed (Buckland and Hay, 2012;
Servon, 2006; Hung, 2003; Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Schreiner and Morduch,
2001; Bhatt and Tang, 1998, 2001; Besley and Coate, 1995).
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“We Don’t Need It” Arguments
Access to Credit:

Schreiner and Morduch (2001) argue that the availability of credit to
Americans not only limits the need for microfinance, but that it also makes the
task of assessing microloan risks that much more difficult.

In developing

countries, there are moneylenders that charge high interest rates (as mentioned
in the first section of this paper) similar to the predatory lending “cash on
demand” organizations in the U.S. However, Americans also have access to
“fringe banks” (Caskey, 1994) such as pawnshops and check-cashing outlets,
and most importantly, to credit cards. Schreiner and Morduch (2001) argue that
the availability of these services reduces the need for microfinance, but other
evidence suggests that this may not be the case.
While the poor in the U.S. certainly have easier access to credit than in
other countries (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001), it is not clear that this access is
universal or that it does not impose usurious rates. In fact, the National
Consumer Law Center, a nonprofit advocacy organization focused on “advancing
fairness in the marketplace for all”, reports that payday loan rates can exceed
1,000% (NCLC, 2012). Microfinance was introduced in Bangladesh to provide
financial access to those who otherwise had to resort to moneylenders and
middlemen. Similarly, the strategy can and should be used domestically to aid
the “underbanked”, or those whose financial needs are not fully met by traditional
commercial institutions. These citizens consist of those with poor credit scores, a
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lack of understanding about the mainstream banking system, limited or unstable
incomes, those recently released from prison, and immigrants (Beard, 2010;
Ledgerwood, 1999). Though the question of whether they would take advantage
of microlending is an open one, there is no doubt that such groups exist in the
U.S.
One indication of the demand for additional forms of credit in the U.S. is
the fact that an entire industry has been created to offer services to the
“underbanked” population. Buckland and Hay (2012) report that “in the United
States, the payday lending industry was estimated to have revenues of around
$40 billion in 2010” (p. 68). A recent study from the Center for Financial Services
Innovation (CFSI) (2012) reports the “underbanked” market generated $78 billion
in fees and interest payments in 2011, with an expected growth in the market of
9% to achieve a total of $85 billion in 2012. The number of “underbanked”
clientele also appears to be growing. The population was estimated by the FDIC
to be about 43 million U.S. adults as of 2010 (Beard, 2010). Although reporting
methodologies may slightly differ, CFSI (2012) reports that number has since
grown to 68 million in 2011. These figures all support the idea of a large
untapped demand for alternative means of credit at reasonable interest rates.
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"Underbanked" Services Industry Growth
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(in Billions)

90
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80
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Figure 3: “Underbanked” Service Industry Growth (2010-2012)
Source: Center for Financial Services Innovation

While fringe banks and payday lending are substantial, the most
significant distinction between lesser developed nations and the U.S. regarding
credit is Americans’ access to credit cards. However, with credit cards come
credit scores. Whether a poor credit score is accrued through the misuse of
these easily attainable cards or reliance on the previously mentioned predatory
services is irrelevant. The fact is that microfinance is intended to help those who
are financially excluded to build their credit, and unfortunately, in America, this
usually means assessing the risk of lending to those with poor credit as opposed
to those with no credit as in developing countries (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001).
Without reliance on peer group lending programs, MFIs may struggle with
assessing an individual’s risk based on their character as opposed to their readily
available credit history. Altering microfinance to meet the needs of those with
poor credit in addition to those with no credit would likely widen the target
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audience for microfinance in the United States, which according to the literature,
is still relatively small.

Size of the U.S. Market

Much of the literature refers to the size of the American market for
microfinance in terms of the self-employment rate in the U.S. An often cited
comparison is that from Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996) that estimates the
American self-employment rate to be 8-20%, or at the most, one third of the 6080% estimate for those in developing countries (p. 6). Another estimate offered
by McKernan and Chen (2005) is that 11% percent of U.S. households own a
small business, classified as having fewer than 500 employees (p. 2). One
should note that these rates are based on existing self-employed populations
rather than the potential markets that may exist for entrepreneurial activity.
Similar to what was encountered in Bangladesh, one can see a case of the
“chicken or the egg” in which low interest rate loans must be made available for
the demand for entrepreneurial investments to be met, yet the need for such
loans is not fully recognized until there is enough identified demand to deem it
feasible. Additionally, the market for small business finance is relatively large
when one considers that small businesses account for over 99% of the 5.7
million U.S. firms (U.S. SBA, 2010). Microenterprises alone account for 60%
(McKernan and Chen, 2005) where microenterprises are those businesses
consisting of five or fewer employees (Servon, 2006).
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Schreiner and Morduch (2001) and Schreiner and Woller (2003) add to
this debate by highlighting the notion that the average percentage of
expenditures per person on microenterprise products or services is much smaller
in the United States compared to the average in developing countries. However,
there are certainly U.S. enterprises that lend themselves more readily to this type
of consumerism, and their financial needs are important. Additionally, there have
been recent pushes by communities to “buy local” in an attempt to enhance their
economic multipliers and become more self-reliant (Shuman, 1998). Shuman
identifies the need to focus on microeconomic perspectives to foster this selfreliance and includes ten mechanisms that have already been implemented at
some level in communities across the nation to help achieve such goals. Even
with the emergence of state and local initiatives aimed at microenterprise and
small business development, the following has been identified as the next
challenge facing microentrepreneurs in the United States: competition from large
scale producers and retailers.

Large Scale Competition

The street vendor market of developing nations differs greatly from the
highly corporate society built around economies of scale in the United States.
American microentrepeneurs face much more competition in the product market
from large scale producers, distributors, and retailers. Schreiner and Morduch
(2001) and Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) use this to argue that there is more
opportunity for microenterprise in the service sector in the United States,
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especially within niche markets. While this may be the case, the U.S. service
sector is often similarly corporatized. In fact, Schreiner and Morduch (2001) point
out how large U.S. companies contribute to the plethora of low-skill, low-wage
jobs offered domestically that are not typically available in developing nations.
Although they do not specifically cite examples, these would include server or
clerk positions with franchised restaurants, coffee shops, pharmacies, grocery
stores, gas stations, and other retail establishments. The abundance of such
positions detracts from the entrepreneurial incentives associated with the sectors
that would otherwise attract small ventures (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001;
Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008).
A primary example of how a microenterprise may face challenges due to
its small size is introduced by Schreiner and Morduch (2001) and Schreiner and
Woller (2003). They claim a prospective entrepreneur is unlikely to obtain and
operate a profitable small agricultural venture in the U.S., whereas the farming
industry is one of the largest microenterprise sectors abroad. This is partly
attributable to limited competition from small farmers producing a commodity for
their own village’s consumption in lesser developing countries as differentiated
from the landscape of large scale agricultural producers and distributors serving
much broader markets in the United States. In addition to the evidence presented
by these authors, it is important to note that U.S. federal policy favors large scale
agribusiness with farming subsidies. Since 1995, 74% of subsidy payments have
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been distributed to the top 10 percent of subsidized farms, with almost two-thirds
of the nation’s farmers receiving no subsidies at all (Sciammacco, 2011).
Not only do financial subsidies more heavily benefit large scale farmers,
so too do other regulations regarding farm practices. In a paper commissioned by
the Agribusiness Accountability Initiative, Mattera (2004) provides several
compelling case studies detailing how U.S. farm policies have benefited
agribusiness either through their explicit regulations or the way in which they are
implemented. One example explained how the USDA addressed the major
manure problems generated by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)
by allowing conservation dollars from the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP) to subsidize attempts by CAFOs to manage such issues
(Mattera, 2004). CAFOs are “livestock facilities that house and feed 1,000 or
more animal units in a confined area” (Mattera, 2004). Rather than addressing
the inherent bias towards large scale farms, this type of regulation simply applies
a band-aid to the issue while encouraging CAFOs. This illustrates a piece of the
next major deterrent from entrepreneurial activity in the United States:
regulations.

“It Won’t Work” Arguments
Regulations

Almost every sector of the U.S. economy is subject to regulation of some
kind by federal, state, or local government. Many of these regulations limit
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American microentrepreneurial activity, often unintentionally (Schreiner and
Morduch, 2001; Schreiner and Woller 2003). From the perspective of lenders,
interest rate caps on banks and stipulations that only regulated depository
institutions may retain deposits limit microfinance lenders’ abilities to become
profitable, a goal which has garnered much attention in the literature and which
will be discussed further in a later section (Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Shreiner and
Morduch, 2001). Though microfinance strategies are inherently aimed at offering
relatively low interest rates, many argue that to sustainably continue their goals
of poverty alleviation, MFIs must earn enough on their loans to re-invest in their
operations. The issue of institutional financial self-sufficiency and the ability to
meet market demands is not unique to the U.S. It still remains a challenge in the
lesser developed countries who were first to implement microfinance. Krahen
and Schmidt (1994) and Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke (1984) argue that
experiments with interest rate caps have been more detrimental than beneficial in
lesser developed nations (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001).
From the borrowers’ perspective, incentives are limited by the need to
obtain building and operating permits and understand tax laws and zoning
regulations. For many service-oriented ventures, business licenses are also
required (i.e. child care, food service, and cosmetology), and child-labor laws
prevent children from working for their parents. These regulations are daunting,
but perhaps the biggest regulatory hurdle to microenterprise is the welfare
system (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001). Yunus (2003) claims that the welfare
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system in the U.S. poses a great challenge to microlending (p. 189). His
statement represents a focus on the safety net that welfare provides the U.S.
poor. Similar to the abundance of access to credit and low-skill jobs in the U.S.,
welfare programs discourage self-employment ventures. Welfare does this not
only by providing basic necessities, but also by enforcing means or asset tests
that ultimately penalize one for increasing his/her earnings and/or savings.
Therefore, one may fear losing benefits necessary to sustain oneself while trying
to accumulate the necessary pre-venture savings that are typically necessary to
start a business. As Schreiner and Woller (2003) summarize, “The problem is
less that limits on income and assets reduce public assistance and more that the
limits kick in before a small firm can support its owner” (p. 1570).
Additionally, it has been challenging to prove that microenterprise
activities meet the Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) requirements
imposed through the Clinton administration’s Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) (Schreiner and Morduch,
2001). Such requirements include obtaining a job within a maximum of five years,
allotting a certain amount of time to job searching, and maintaining a certain
minimum level of assets (Personal responsibility, 1996). If one is prevented from
saving money to use as seed capital and is forced to search for a job when they
are truly interested in starting their own business, the battle will likely be a long,
hard fought one, perhaps lasting longer than five years. However, the Obama
administration has recently released a waiver for certain TANF regulations in

21

targeted areas. A July 2012 memo highlighted federal interest in increasing
TANF waiver flexibility for innovative methods encouraging employment (U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services). Time will tell whether or not these
innovative methods include microfinance strategies.

Institutional Difficulty in Becoming Self-Sufficient

There is a dispute in the literature as to whether or not financial selfsufficiency at the organizational level should be a goal of U.S. microfinance
programs or if such a goal would be in direct conflict with the social mission of
their practices. While this is not the primary focus of this paper, it is certainly a
debate to be acknowledged as American MFIs have struggled with these
competing ideas. This paper argues that true institutional self-sufficiency occurs
when MFI’s successfully rely on PGLPs to reduce costs. Challenges to PGLP
implementation in the U.S. will be discussed further in the next section. The
aforementioned challenges of interest rate caps, limits on depository abilities for
non-bank MFIs, competition from other credit sources, and a relatively smaller
target market in the U.S. contribute to higher transactions costs for many U.S.
lenders when compared to microfinance practices in developing countries.
However, such arguments cannot be made for U.S. microfinance institutions if
these MFIs are not utilizing PGLPs which serve as the major source for
overcoming microlending transaction costs challenges. These incomplete
arguments as addressed in the literature are reviewed here for the sake of
comprehensiveness.

22

In the U.S., upper limits on interest rates vary by state from an 8% cap in
Alabama to 24% in Washington, D.C. (LoanBack, 2011). Some states provide
different benchmarks for various sized loans, and many provide exceptions for
mortgage loans. For instance, North Carolina does not designate an interest rate
limit for loans greater than $25,000, but loans with a principal amount smaller
than that threshold are entitled to a cap. That cap is determined as the maximum
between 16% or 6% greater than the latest published U.S. Treasury Bills rate
(State of NC, 1979). North Carolina does not place an interest rate limit on
mortgage loans, unless that loan is made for less than $10,000 and is not
provided by an approved list of lenders (State of NC, 1979). South Carolina does
not place a limit on loans in which a written contract is utilized, though the state
distinguishes agricultural loans for less than $25,000 as a separate category,
entitled to a 16% cap (State of SC, 1984). Understanding how one’s particular
state’s usury law is constructed is the first step to determining what interest rates
can be charged for various sized loans and how those limits will affect the ways
in which the lending institution is structured (i.e. reliance on PGLPs, ability to
raise funds, number and salaries of hired staff, etc.).
Additionally, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) requires
regulated financial institutions to meet the needs of the communities within which
they are situated, including low-income residents. The CRA calls for lending and
depository services, but many MFIs are non-bank institutions such as NGOs that
are not regulated as banks, and thus restricted from receiving deposits
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(Schreiner and Woller, 2003), even though their mission may be to serve the
needs of low-income residents. Thus, banks sometimes meet the requirements
of the CRA by allowing local microfinance institutions to make loans on their
behalf without evaluating the risks associated with those projects. This leads to a
structure in which some MFIs are unable to accumulate savings deposits,
reducing their services offered and their ability to sustain themselves through
lean funding periods. At the same time this detracts from typical financial
institutions’ incentives to develop innovative lending mechanisms for the CRA
target audiences (Schreiner and Woller, 2003).
For these reasons, it has been well documented that achieving financial
self-sufficiency has been a greater challenge for American MFIs than those in
developing nations (Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Schreiner and Morduch, 2001;
Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). They argue that to become sustainable entities,
interest rates would need to be raised and the target market would have to
expand, possibly defeating the intended purpose of microfinance.

Quayes

(2012) evaluates the perceived trade-off between the two goals of selfsustainability and poverty alleviation in his article “Depth of Outreach and
Financial Sustainability of Microfinance Institutions”. He finds from the reporting
MFIs that the financially sustainable organizations actually have greater poverty
alleviation effects or “depth of outreach”. Thus, this trade-off may be an illusion
caused by a failure to implement microfinance as designed.
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Servon (2006) and Counts (2008) also argue that strategies should be
sought to encourage both financial sustainability and poverty alleviation, claiming
that they are not mutually exclusive goals. Additional arguments suggest there
needs to be a focus on innovation and efficiency regardless of whether or not
financial sustainability is achieved (Bhatt, Tang, and Painter, 2001; Buckley,
2001; Morduch and Schreiner, 2001). Finally, when compared to other job
creation, poverty alleviation, or economic development strategies, the costeffectiveness of microfinance programs are seen as reasonable (Sengupta and
Aubuchon, 2008; Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, 1996; Servon and Doshna, 2000).
Again, the financial self-sufficiency arguments fail to acknowledge the necessity
of PGLPs as a critical component of true microfinance programs.

Inability to Implement Peer Group Lending Programs (PGLPs)
The aforementioned variations between U.S. and lesser developed
nations’ microfinance strategies focus on fundamental differences between the
political and economic frameworks within which each operates. These
differences ultimately contribute to the difficulty faced in the United States to
utilize the most important facet of the successful microfinance models used in
Bangladesh and many other developing countries, peer group lending programs
(PGLPs). Morduch and Schreiner (2001) argue that reliance on arbitrarily created
(rather than self-selected) groups, uneven enforcement of joint liability, higher
transportation

and opportunity costs associated with attending meetings, the
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transient and individualistic nature of Americans, and a general lack of social
capital preclude group lending strategies from being as effective in the United
States as they have been abroad. For instance, in Bangladesh, the opportunity
for women to interact with community members outside their family on a weekly
basis is considered a privilege due to the religious practice of purdah that
restricts women from leaving their homes (Yunus, 2003), whereas that same
opportunity for interaction in the U.S. may be viewed as a burden on one’s time
and resources (i.e. fuel, bus fare, time in other social or work-related activities,
etc.).
Schreiner and Woller (2003) add further to the argument that the diverse
nature of U.S. poor populations (which arguably detracts from social capital)
prevents widespread successful use of American microfinance PGLPs. Of the
various reasons given for the success of PGLPs elsewhere, and the relative lack
of such success in using them in the United States, the most common appears to
be a difference in the amount of social capital amongst the differing societies. In
their discussions of PGLPs, Bhatt and Tang (1998, 2001), Buckland and Hay
(2012), Servon (2006), Hung (2003, 2006), and Besley and Coate (1995) each
highlight this difference as it relates to societies at large and more specifically,
their poor populations.
Bhatt and Tang (1998) argue that there are three primary forms of PGLPs,
two of which enforce joint liability, and each with varying degrees to which
transaction costs are applied to the lenders and the borrowers (displayed in
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Table 2 below). In the U.S., social capital tends to be lower than in environments
with less formally educated populations and weaker legal enforcement (Guiso, et
al., 2004). Additionally, Costa and Khan (2003) and Putnam (1993b) demonstrate
that social capital reserves in America have been decreasing over the past
quarter to half-decade due to increases in ability to travel, ethnic heterogeneity,
and women’s participation in the workforce. Therefore, the transaction costs
associated with initially building the social capital amongst groups of peer
borrowers are often high for the lenders and borrowers involved with U.S. MFIs
utilizing PGLPs (Bhatt and Tang, 1998). Bhatt and Tang (2001) later argued that
many peer group lending programs in the U.S. did not acknowledge the
difference in levels of existing social capital among poor in the U.S. and poor in
lesser developed countries. Arguably, this lack of focus on variations in cultures
has led to ineffective implementation of PGLPs and the ultimate notion that they
cannot be used successfully in the U.S.
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Group Lending Arrangement A
Group Loan – Joint Liability
Lender
Burdens

Pre Loan Disbursement
Outreach
Training
Loan Disbursement
Application
Loan request evaluation
Post Loan Disbursement
Record keeping
Collection

Borrower
Burdens

Pre Loan Disbursement
Outreach
Screening/Recruitment
Group formation
Training
Contract design
Loan Disbursement
Application
Group projects appraisal
Group-needs assessment
Loan request evaluation
Negotiation
Post Loan Disbursement
Networking
Record keeping
Monitoring
Sanctioning
Repayment

Group Lending Arrangement B
Individual Loan –Joint
Liability
Pre Loan Disbursement
Outreach
Screening/Recruitment
Training
Loan Disbursement
Application
Project appraisal
Loan request evaluation
Post Loan Disbursement
Record keeping
Technical assistance
Tracking loans
Collection

Pre Loan Disbursement
Screening/Recruitment
Group formation
Training
Contract design
Loan Disbursement
Application
Loan request evaluation
Post Loan Disbursement
Networking
Monitoring
Sanctioning
Repayment

Group Lending Arrangement C
Individual Loan- Individual
Liability
Pre Loan Disbursement
Outreach
Screening/Recruitment
Group formation
Training
Loan Disbursement
Application
Project appraisal
Loan request evaluation
Post Loan Disbursement
Record keeping
Technical assistance
Monitoring
Tracking loans
Collection
Pre Loan Disbursement
Group formation
Training
Loan Disbursement
Application
Loan request evaluation
Post Loan Disbursement
Networking
Repayment

Table 2: “Three Group Lending Arrangements and Distribution of Transaction Cost Burdens”
Source: Bhatt and Tang, 1998

However, the relative levels of individualism, transience, and social capital
in the United States may not be as ubiquitous as presented in the literature
reviewed thus far. As Long (1988) points out, data supports the notion that
Americans are rather mobile, yet what is not often reported are the varying levels
of migration amongst different cohorts and the associated reasons for such
moves. He finds that there is a higher propensity to migrate among younger,
more educated populations and those that have moved before with the overall
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amount of migration not increasing over the forty year period from 1940 to 1980.
Most notably, Long (1988) highlights eight “main” reasons that account for 70 to
80 percent of American interstate or interregional migrations, five of which pertain
to employment or retirement. (p. 251). In support of such findings, he contrasts
the surge of migration after WWII with an expanding economy and many skilled
laborers to that of the decline in interstate moves associated with “well-educated
baby boomers holding on to jobs in a slow economy” in the 1970s. Some
occupations continue to lend themselves more readily to relocation than others.
Macroeconomic forces should be accounted for as well, as the most recent
recession has illustrated.
Additionally, Ellickson (1991) highlights the ability of “close-knit” groups in
the U.S. to self-regulate in order to achieve welfare-maximizing norms for all
involved parties. His research focuses primarily on the ways in which cattlefarmers in Shasta County, California handle disputes. He then combines his
observations from Shasta County, with knowledge of the “larger social-control
system” to determine that welfare-maximizing norms exist amongst groups that
share informal power and easily communicate information relating to such
control. Ellickson notes that individuals could belong to several close-knit groups
of various types, such as religious, residential, and work-related. The goal with
PGLP implementation should be to target these existing groups that are also in
need of capital investment. There are clearly such groups within the United
States, one of which is described later in this chapter.
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Insights into the Success (or lack thereof) of PGLPs
It is important to examine the “social capital” concept that appears to play
such a significant role in the successful development of peer group lending
programs. As highlighted by Robert Putnam (1993a), three forms of social capital
are of critical importance: trust, social norms, and networks, with the first often
arising mutually through the enforcement of the latter two. Putnam (1993a)
considers literature from several influential economists and sociologists to
conclude that “Norms such as those that undergird social trust evolve because
they lower transaction costs and facilitate cooperation” (p. 172). As expressed in
the previous section, the ability to lower transaction costs is crucial to the
success of PGLPs.
Social capital lowers transaction costs in PGLPs by serving as collateral,
just as other forms of capital often serve this purpose in commercial financial
transactions. A major difference between social capital and other forms of capital
(i.e. built, natural, and financial), however, is that social capital is considered a
“moral resource” according to Albert Hirschman (Putnam, 1993a, p. 169). This
concept implies that the supply of social capital actually increases with
consumption and disappears with the lack of it. Several ways in which social
norms can be used and therefore enhanced are enumerated by Flora and Flora
(2008). These include, the creation of groups, the subsequent interaction within
(bonding) and between (bridging) groups, visioning, and participating in
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collaborative pursuits (p. 117). Successful peer lending groups represent several
of these activities.
An additional concept that separates social capital from other traditional
forms of capital is that it is often provided as a public good. “Like all public goods,
social capital tends to be undervalued and undersupplied by private
agents…This means that social capital, unlike other forms of capital, must often
be produced as a by-product of other social activities” (Putnam, 1993a, p. 170).
For example, social capital may not initially exist amongst a group of individuals,
but through regular exchanges, they are likely to become familiar with each
other’s dispositions, abilities, and interests and to evaluate each other’s
trustworthiness. Hence, mutual trust (as a form of social capital) is established
through multiple interactions. A common fear associated with the provision of
public goods is that “free riders” and “shirkers” will benefit from the availability of
a good while limiting their contributions toward its provision. Putnam (1993)
highlights the ability of informal savings and loan platforms known as rotating
credit associations (RoCAs) to overcome these fears through reliance upon
norms and networks of reciprocity. Yunus (2007) alludes to the fact that PGLPs
are institutions similarly able to take advantage of such existing norms and
networks when he claims they are “enterprises driven by an attitude of ‘social
consciousness’” (p. 202).
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Local Food Systems
Defined
Over the past couple decades there has been a growing awareness of
and interest in local food systems. This has been demonstrated by the
introduction of new terms and concepts such as the “slow food movement”,
“localism”, and even the New Oxford American Dictionary’s 2007 word of the
year: “locavore” (a person who eats primarily food grown within a certain radius
deemed local), as well as related initiatives instituted at the federal, state, and
local levels (Martinez, et al., 2010). Examples include the “Know Your Farmer,
Know Your Food” program implemented at the national level and branding
strategies such as the “Certified South Carolina” campaign targeted at product
promotion within the state. Across the nation there have also been (rather
successful) local and statewide efforts to encourage growth in the number of
available farmer’s markets. Tropp (2010) reports USDA findings that the number
of farmer’s markets in the United States increased 200% from only 1,775
markets in 1994 to 5,274 in 2009 (p.11). Similarly, community supported
agriculture (CSA) ventures have exploded from only 2 in the mid 1980’s to an
estimated 3,400 as of 2010 (Tropp, 2010, p. 12). However, farmer’s markets and
CSAs are only two pieces of typically larger, more complex food systems.
Although there is no agreed upon definition for local food systems,
Martinez, et al. (2010) have summarized their general characteristics in their
Economic Research report Local Food Systems: Concepts, Impacts, and Issues.
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The report concludes that local food systems are classified based on geography
as well as “social and supply chain characteristics” (p. 3). What constitutes a
local geographical region for food systems is dependent upon population density
and the subjective assessments of individuals. The distinguishable supply chain
facets consist of direct-to-consumer marketing and direct-to- retail/foodservice
marketing. Direct-to-consumer marketing includes farmer’s markets, community
supported agriculture (CSA), farm stands, community gardens, and pick your
own (PYO) ventures, and direct-to-retail/foodservice marketing involves sales to
restaurants, schools, retail stores, and hospitals (Martinez, et al., 2010).
Farm incubators offer yet another mechanism around which farmers are
organizing. With the average age of American farmers approaching 60 years old
(NASS, 2007a), many are recognizing the need to encourage young aspiring
farmers to move into the field (Langston, 2011). Farm incubators are seen as one
method of reaching out to a younger population of new farmers. Reducing the
costs that would normally be placed upon one agricultural venture, an incubator
provides shared resources from which multiple growers can take advantage.
These resources include land, training, networking opportunities, marketing, and
sometimes financing. Similar ventures targeting refugees and immigrants have
been created to offer a feasible transition to American farming from the
subsistence farming one may have been familiar with in their home country
(Langston, 2011).
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Alignment with PGLP Microfinance Models
As described above, local food systems rely heavily on small farms as
their major source of food production. These small-scale farmers are not immune
to the challenges described in previous sections such as access to America’s
plethora of credit sources, regulations, and competition from large scale
producers. However, the market of U.S. small farmers is ripe for microfinance
lending for multiple reasons.
First, 91 percent of farms were identified as “small” in the 2007 U.S.
Census of Agriculture. These 1.9 million small farms represent a market almost 6
times greater than the estimated number of individuals served by microloans in
2010 (FIELD, 2012a). Additionally, they serve an active market whose demand is
represented by consumers’ higher willingness to pay for local products compared
to others (Martinez, et al., 2010). Wimberly, et al. (2002) found that Americans
perceive small and family farms as more desirable than large and corporate
farms. They similarly demonstrate the willingness to pay notion with a national
longitudinal survey in which Americans agreed 2:1 that family farms should be
supported even if it led to increased food prices. A local food assessment survey
conducted in Greenville, SC found that a majority of attendees at a health and
food festival were willing to pay up to a 20% premium for ethically grown, healthy
foods (County of Greenville, 2012).
The 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture further highlights the fact that three
out of five primary small farm operators selling directly to consumers were
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“socially disadvantaged” women and minorities (Martinez, et al. 2010). The
Census confirms the trends of increasing ethnic, racial, and gender diversity
among farmers (NASS, 2007a). Interestingly, women and minorities are groups
that are often targeted for microfinance loans in the United States (Edgcomb,
Klein, and Clark, 1996). The recent creation of farm incubators geared towards
certain minority and immigrant residents (i.e. Seattle Tilth and the Somali Bantu
Community Association of New Hampshire) highlights the ability of local food
systems to incorporate these typically disadvantaged populations into a
mainstream industry.
The fact that Martinez et al. (2010) describe local food systems not only by
geographic boundaries but also by social characteristics is telling. Their findings
included farmers’ reliance on one another to help fill gaps in demand, especially
those in multi-farm CSAs. Rogers, et al. (1988) imply that U.S. farmers have
learned to rely on one another out of necessity, noting their increased
organization since the national landscape has changed from one of many selfsufficient farmers to one in which a small percentage of the population works in
the industry. They argue that farmer organizations such as farm bureaus and the
National Farmers Organization (NFO) evolved for educational, economic, and
political reasons. The authors also devote attention to the importance of farmer
cooperatives, voluntary organizations that require collaboration to benefit from
shared costs of certain business functions. According to the National Council for
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Farmer Cooperatives, all two million American farmers belong to at least one coop (2010).
Though maybe not referred to in such terms, farmer organizations have
existed for centuries prior to official farm bureaus and co-ops and have continued
to evolve with new challenges arising over time. For example, in the western
United States, public or community acequias have been used since at least the
late 16th century, upon Spaniard settlement (Hutchins, 1928). Acequias are
institutions in which farmers demonstrate their ability to share responsibility for
the maintenance and allocation of a valuable resource critical to their work in
times of bounty and scarcity. In their review of the Culebra Watershed in
Colorado, Hicks and Peña (2003) detail the continued reliance on the principles
of the acequia institution today. They anecdotally report an instance in which one
farmer allowed another to farm some of his land during the 2002 season in which
the latter farmer’s acequia was not allocated its scheduled annual water
distribution. The authors report that even in the face of superseding prior
appropriation laws (which do not allow diversion of water from one farmer’s land
to another), farmers continue to collaborate and support one another as they face
the persistent challenge of water scarcity. This challenge has led to the creation
of a similar resource management institution known as mutual water companies,
many of which originated in the mid-1800s and continue to operate today
(Russell, 1939). These mutual water companies allow agricultural users to selfgovern the allocation of their shared water supply and are oftentimes able to
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avoid public utilities regulations (Strickland, 2011). To use Ellickson’s term,
farmers collaborating in such a way are creating “order without law” or at least a
different order than would result with sole reliance on the formal legal system.
Martinez et al. (2010) additionally provided the following insight regarding
the importance of social features in successful local food systems:
The concept of local food may also extend to those who produced the
food: the personality and ethics of the grower; the attractiveness of the
farm and surrounding landscape; and other factors that make up the ‘story
behind the food’. (p. 4).
Although Sage (2003) focused on southwest Ireland, he also highlighted the
significance of mutual trust in the success of what he termed good food networks
(similar to local food systems as they have been referenced in this paper). In
their discussion of local food system benefits, Hughes, et al. (2007) refer to
Goldschmidt’s 1946 conclusion that there exist a strong connection between
small-scale production and community well-being, with not only economic
benefits, but more importantly, social benefits accruing to community members.
These theories and their possible applications to our nation’s current local food
systems underscore the potential of small farmers involved in such systems to
take advantage of the cost-mitigating and capital building tool of PGLPs. This
concept presents an interesting area of study for further analysis in this paper.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Developing the Survey Instrument
This study aimed to empirically test the hypothesis that small farmers
participating in farm incubators provide a suitable target audience capable of
capitalizing on peer group lending programs. To test this major hypothesis, an
online survey was developed. Initially, informal conversations with local farmers
(who are not included in the sampling frame) in upstate South Carolina and
thesis committee members proficient in survey design were conducted to help
establish the essential framework and language for an online survey. Next, the
survey

was

developed

and

pre-tested

using

cognitive

interviews

(as

recommended by Dillman, 2009) with additional farmers from outside the sample
population, as well as farm incubator staff, to identify and address areas of
redundancy, confusion, and concern. The cognitive interviews were conducted
over the phone while respondents took the survey online, to gather feedback
regarding wording, as well as navigational issues. The survey was then revised
to its final version based on the feedback received from cognitive interviews in
accordance with online survey methodology and phrasing recommendations from
Dillman (2009) and posted to an online survey site in both English and Spanish
versions.
The final survey contained questions addressing the demographics of
farm incubator participants and the characteristics of the incubators themselves
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in the hopes of shedding light on these relatively new institutions and the
individuals that they attract. The questions relating to the participants included
those regarding age, race, nationality, whether or not the individual was Hispanic,
gender, challenges faced in becoming profitable farmers, and participation status
with the incubator (current or past). Questions relating to the incubator included
those regarding the duration of participation in the program, the number of
participants involved, and the services offered. Additionally, questions were
asked to gauge whether or not this population lends itself to a PGLP model of
microfinance and to what extent the challenges identified in the literature affect
one’s willingness to participate in such a program. The development of these
questions is detailed below, addressing each in terms of the role it played in
answering the three major hypotheses of this study and the expectations
underlying those hypotheses.
The underlying expectations of the study were that willingness to
participate in PGLPs would be largely positive among farm incubator
respondents and that social capital would exist among them. Social capital was
expected to manifest itself both within the incubator (representing intra-group
“bonding” social capital) and with groups extending beyond the incubator
(demonstrating the wider networks associated with local food systems, or
“bridging” social capital). After providing definitions of microfinance and peer
group lending programs, the general willingness to participate in PGLPs was
tested with the following two questions.
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1. Thinking of several colleagues whom you trust, would you be willing to
form a peer group and participate in a PGLP as defined above, in which
you would all be responsible for repayment of each other's loans, thus
reducing the interest rates available to you?
If a respondent answered “No” or “Not sure” to this question, he/she was asked
the following question based on the understanding from Bhatt and Tang that
PGLPs are sometimes implemented without joint liability, though the transaction
costs burdens are shifted more heavily toward the financial institution, reducing
the amount by which interest rates may be lowered.
2. Would you be more willing to participate in a PGLP if shared liability for
each other's loans was not enforced, thus slightly reducing interest rates
available to you, but not as much as in the previous scenario of a
traditional PGLP?
The responses to these questions were also used as the dependent variable in
assessing the effects various other aspects had on one’s willingness to
participate, items which will be addressed in more detail later in this section.
The notion that social capital existed among farm incubator participants
was assessed using the following questions.
1. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other farmers
associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or guidance?
2. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other local farmers
not associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or guidance?
3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following four
statements?
 Most other farmers associated with my incubator face the same
challenges I do.
 I share similar values with most other farmers associated with my
incubator.
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Most other farmers associated with my incubator come from a
similar background as me.
I feel that I can easily relate to most other farmers associated with
my incubator.

4. Apart from the incubator, are you involved in any local level organizations,
groups, associations, or programs that relate to farming (such as a
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) group, mutual water district,
producer association, Farm to School program, etc.)?
Based on the literature, those that are underbanked, or have financial needs not
currently being met by the traditional commercial banking system should be the
targets of microfinance. To test whether respondents had a general financial
need the first four of the following five questions listed were asked with the final
question addressing the current likelihood of having one’s financial needs met by
various institutions.
1. Not including credit card use, have you taken out any loans to secure
resources for your farming business in the past year?
2. Considering these loan(s) you received over the past year for your farming
business (from banks, credit unions, family members, etc.), in what range
would you estimate the total amount falls? Please do not include credit
card usage.
3. Have you used a credit card to secure resources for your farming
business in the past year?
4. Approximately how much have you charged to your card(s) in the past
year? Please only consider charges for acquiring resources for your
farming business.
5. Currently, how likely or unlikely are you to use the following resources to
obtain capital for your farming business?
 Credit card
 Commercial bank loan
 Credit union loan
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Loan from a friend or relative
Farm incubator loan
Savings
Government loan (Ex. Beginning Farmer and Rancher loans)

Claims that higher transportation and opportunity costs reduce American interest
in PGLPs were tested with the following questions.
1. On average, how much time does it take you to travel one way from home
to your incubator?
2. On average, how many times a month do you meet with others (farmers,
mentors, staff, etc.) from your incubator?
3. Are you required by your incubator to attend meetings/events away from
the incubator (such as farmers markets, training classes, etc.)?
4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following three
statements?
 I feel that required meetings/events with other farmers are worth my
time.
 I feel that required meetings/events with current or potential
customers are worth my time.
 I feel that required meetings/events with mentors, staff, and trainers
are worth my time.
Finally, to control for differentiation between costs of living associated with
metropolitan versus non-metropolitan areas and to account for more general
regional differentiation, questions were asked regarding the respondent’s zip
code as well as the zip code of his/her incubator’s primary location.
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Developing the Survey Frame
Once the survey was developed, the sampling frame had to be
established. As previously mentioned, the sampling frame consisted of farm
incubator participants. This decision was based on their involvement in local food
systems, their interactions with mentors, clients, and other farmers, and their
anticipated need for financial capital as beginning farmers. Specifically, adult
U.S. citizens or permanent residents who spoke English or Spanish fluently were
targeted due to the study’s focus on U.S. PGLPs and the American context within
which a program might operate. The most comprehensive record of U.S. farm
incubators was identified as Tufts University’s New Entry National Incubator
Farm Training Initiative (NIFTI) database. Starting with this database, two
Canadian incubators, several college training programs, organizations currently
only recognized as potential incubator sites, and several programs only serving
refugees were disqualified for this particular study. Additionally, four incubators
(one in SC, one in NC, and two in OR) were added to the list based on
recommendations from other incubator staff. In the end, there were 21 U.S.
incubators with 265 farmers currently or recently (within the past five years)
participating in their programs representing the sampling frame for the survey
(Appendix A).
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Implementing the Survey
Staff members associated with the farm incubators listed in Appendix A
were contacted by phone to explain the purpose of the survey and to ask for
willingness to provide contact lists for their current and recent (within the past 5
years) participants. If unable to distribute their members’ contact information, a
request was made for someone in the organization to serve as a liaison that
would disseminate all pertinent survey information to those farmers currently and
recently associated with their incubator. Dillman (2009) recommends making five
contacts for mail surveys to reduce non-response rates and sampling error.
Although the contacts differed from a mail survey in that the contact letters were
not sent by third-class postal mail, a combination of phone and email
correspondence was used to encourage participation. Dillman (2009) highlights
that what is of most importance is not necessarily the total number of contacts,
but the differentiation between each successive one. To ensure that such
differentiation was accomplished, Dillman’s template for successful email
reminders was revised to apply to this particular study. Additional calls were also
made to ensure the sampling frame count was updated based on the actual
number of farmers contacted by incubator staff. The final count of 265 contacted
farmers and a useable 84 out of 102 survey responses resulted in a 32%
response rate.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
The collected survey data was coded and ultimately analyzed using
statistical software (STATA) to determine if PGLPs could be used as a financing
tool for small and start-up farmers in farm incubators. The results were first
divided into the following categories upon which different analyses were
performed: demographics, information regarding the incubators, and dependent,
independent, and control variables measuring participants’ willingness to
participate in PGLPs. The demographic information was totaled and graphed to
provide a picture of what the farm incubator population looks like. Similar
measures were taken with the incubator information to determine what
characterizes these institutions across the U.S. Finally, the dependent variables
of willingness to participate in a Peer Group Lending Program with and without
shared liability were analyzed separately using Fisher’s Exact Test to determine
if any relationship was present with twenty-five independent variables in the
following categories: social capital, financial capital access, transportation costs,
and opportunity costs (a full list can be found in Appendix B). Once basic
statistically significant relationships were identified, Simple Logistic Regressions
and Linear Probability Models were run on those combinations of variables to
determine the effect that each had on the outcome of willingness to participate in
a PGLP either with or without joint liability.
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The analyses performed serve to test the following expectations. It was
predicted that the results of the survey would show that social capital and strong
networks exist among farmers participating in farm incubators, though the
respondents were likely to possess social capital generated from sources beyond
the incubator itself. Additionally, it was expected that the willingness of farmers to
participate in a PGLP structure would be largely positive, associated with social
capital measures and the need for access to financial capital. Farmers’
willingness to participate in PGLPs were anticipated to be negatively associated
with increased transportation costs and perceived opportunity costs. While
findings from this sample may not allow for statistical inferences to be made
regarding the larger small farm population, reasonable deductions can be made
that may lead to further research.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Respondent and Incubator Characteristics
The survey respondents are demographically similar, with the most
noticeable differences being gender and incubator participation status. The study
participants are primarily (83%) white, with all but six out of 78 born in the United
States, and only one out of 75 respondents is Hispanic. As seen in Figure 4
below, 75% are between the ages of 26 and 45.
Into which age category do you fall?
56 to 65 years

7

46 to 55 years

7

36 to 45 years

36

26 to 35 years

35

18 to 25 years

10
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Number of Responses

Figure 4: Age of Survey Respondents

The majority of respondents live in metro regions, with 69 out of 75 living in
Metropolitan areas, 3 in micropolitan areas, 1 in a small town, and 2 in rural
areas according to the Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA 2.0) Codes based
on zip-code level data as reported by the Rural Health Research Center. The
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major demographic variations are gender and incubator participation status as
seen in Figures 5 and 6. Based on the proclivity of typical microfinance programs
to lend to women, the relationship between gender and willingness to participate
in a PGLP was examined using Fisher’s Exact Tests, but with p-values of .161
with liability and .223 without shared liability the associations were not statistically
significant.
Have you recently received or are
you currently receiving services
from a farm incubator or other
farm training program?

What is your gender?

Male
49%
51%

Female

42.1%

n=79

57.9%

Current
Participant
Past
Participant

n=95

Figure 5: Gender of Survey Respondents

Figure 6: Participation Status

The incubator programs also appear similar based on the responses to
questions regarding incubator size, services offered, and length of program
participation. The majority of incubators were relatively small, as seen in Figure
7. In an effort to provide a better understanding of the number of incubators in
each size category rather than the number of participants in each sized
incubator, the responses were grouped based on zip code data. One might
expect the small program size to encourage social capital amongst members and
foster an environment conducive to PGLPs. However, the small cohorts could
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also mean that there are few peers among which to select as a group of
borrowers, limiting one’s willingness to participate in a shared liability program.
This is something reviewed in more detail in the following section.

Number of Incubators

How many other farmers currently
participate/participated when you did in your farm
incubator?
10
8
6
4
2
0
0 to 5

6 to 10

11 to 20

21 to 30

Number of Other Participants

Figure 7: Incubator Size

The length of time one participates in an incubator program may appear at
first to vary substantially, until the results are divided into categories of current
and past participant responses (see Figure 8, below). Then it becomes apparent
that the majority of previous incubator members participated for seven months to
less than one year (basically a growing season) with greater variation among
current participants. One might expect the difference in duration to play a role in
relationship building and willingness to participate in PGLPs, however there was
no such correlation detected.
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Number of Responses

How long have you been/were you a member of your
farm incubator?
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Past Participant
Current Participant

Less than 3 3 to 6
months
months

7 months
to less
than 1 year

1 to 2
years

More than
2 years

Figure 8: Participation Duration

The services offered by the incubators included all ten categories
identified in the survey question (see Figure 9, below) in addition to “mentorship”,
a response which was written in by two individuals from different incubators. The
other write-in responses to the question regarding incubator-offered services
provided more detailed explanations of arrangements that mostly overlapped the
categories of training (education), networking, and equipment. The incubatoroffered services were totaled by responses, not by incubator since some
programs place participants on various sites with different amenities, incubators
may have altered their formats and offerings from one class to another, and what
is ultimately important is not which services are offered, but which ones are most
taken advantage of by participating farmers.
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Figure 9 depicts the percentage of respondents recognizing a service was
offered by their incubator (“offered”), and the relative utilization of those services
(“utilized”). For instance, what one quickly learns is that land is not often sold by
incubators (only 9% of respondents were offered that option), but 100% of those
respondents who had access to land for sale took advantage of that service,
indicating the likely need for such arrangements. This particular option was
offered by two programs in the West, one in the Northeast, and one in which the
location is unknown, indicating affordable land may not be a location specific
demand. Additionally, it is not likely that participants in search of such a service
would have self-selected these programs, since the incubators are widely
dispersed geographically. Supporting this notion were the responses to what
study participants ranked as their greatest challenges to becoming profitable
farmers, an issue to which will be returned in a following section. The next
section reviews the results of the three hypothesized relationships expected to
exist among farm incubator participants regarding their willingness to participate
in PGLPs.
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100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Utilized
Offered

Service

Figure 9: Percentage of Respondents with Access to Services and Relative Utilization

Hypotheses
As suggested by the literature review, there are three primary hypotheses
which this study aimed to test. They include the following: (1) Social capital and
willingness to participate in a PGLP will be positively correlated; (2) Need for
access to financial capital and willingness to participate in a PGLP will be
positively correlated; (3) Transportation and associated opportunity costs will be
negatively correlated with willingness to participate in PGLPs. Additionally, these
hypotheses are based on the expectations that social capital would exist among
incubator participants and that willingness to participate in PGLPs would be
largely positive among them. These will each be addressed in turn in this section
along with additional findings that were made during data collection and analysis.
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Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis is that social capital as captured by several ordinal
level measures will be positively associated with willingness to participate in
PGLPs. The responses to the social capital questions reveal that most survey
participants do exhibit social capital amongst their farmer peers. About 75% of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with three of the four questions regarding
social capital among their incubator cohort. The one incongruity was the question
addressing whether or not participants felt they came from similar backgrounds
with which only 20% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed. This was the
case despite the demographic results presented earlier and the strong affirmative
response to the question regarding whether or not participants shared similar
values. This anomaly may lend itself to further inquiry. What then are the
differences among farm incubator participants that are perceived as creating
various “backgrounds”? Do they relate to previous education or career choices,
socio-economic status, or some other characterization? Do they detract from the
social cohesion experienced among incubator cohorts?
For now, the “background” question was given extra attention by
producing two separate social capital composite mean scores for each
respondent; one including the background response and one excluding it.
Additionally, those with an affirmative “background” answer were compared to
those with a neutral or negative response. Each of these independent social
capital variables were tested for relationships to one’s willingness to participate in

53

a PGLP using Fisher’s Exact Test. Results across each category were not
significant, leading one to believe that the feelings an incubatee has regarding
one’s comparative background with other participants does not significantly
change the social dynamics of the group, or that the social cohesion among the
members is not strong enough to promote a PGLP structure regardless of the
“background” issue.
Other measures of social interaction included reliance on other farmers
within and outside of the incubator program and affiliation with organizations or
groups outside of the incubator. These were also tested for correlation with
willingness to participate in a PGLP. At first, it appears as though there again is
no significant relationship. However, when comparing the subset of respondents
that reported a high degree of reliance on other farmers within the incubator but a
low level of reliance on farmers outside of the incubator, a relationship becomes
apparent. Fisher’s Exact results reveal that this group of individuals is more
inclined to participate in PGLPs, either with or without shared liability enforced,
the results of which are presented below in Tables 3 and 4.
Strong Reliance within
Incubator, Low Outside
Willingness to Participate in
a PGLP (with Liability)
No

No
17

Yes
3

Total
20

Yes
Total

12
29

10
13

22
42

1-sided Fisher's Exact=.035
Table 3: Fisher’s Exact Results - Strong “Within Incubator” Reliance with Willingness to Participate in a PGLP
with Shared Liability
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Strong Reliance within
Incubator, Low Outside
Willingness to Participate in
a PGLP (without Liability)
No
Yes
Total

No
19
21
40

Yes
3
13
16

Total
22
34
56

1-sided Fisher's Exact=.043
Table 4: Fisher’s Exact Results - Strong “Within Incubator” Reliance with Willingness to Participate in a PGLP
without Shared Liability

Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis stems from the literature regarding the unbanked
and underbanked populations. The expectation is that those who identified a
need for access to financial capital are more willing to participate in PGLPs.
Similar to the findings regarding the first hypothesis, the association between
willingness to participate in PGLPs and measures of financial need were not
statistically significant using Fisher’s Exact Tests. The variables included in these
analyses were whether or not a respondent had used a credit card or taken out a
loan for their farming venture in the past year, the rank he/she assigned to
“access to financial capital” as a challenge to becoming a profitable farmer, and
whether or not he/she utilized incubator-provided access to financial assistance
or small business planning. The only significant relationship found was between
the willingness to participate in a PGLP with relaxed assumptions (i.e. no joint
liability) and whether or not a participant had used incubator-offered small
business planning. The results of the Fisher’s exact test can be seen in Table 5.
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Utilized Incubator-Provided
Financial Planning Services
Willing to Participate in a
No
Yes
PGLP (without Liability)
No
8
8

Total
16

Yes

7

25

32

Total

15

33

48

1-sided Fisher’s Exact=.051
Table 5: Fisher’s Exact Results – Utilization of Business/Financial Planning Services with Willingness to Participate
in a PGLP without Shared Liability

A probable explanation would be that those who are using financial planning
services are most interested in and open to various financing opportunities.
However, this is not supported by tests for relationships among participants’
willingness to borrow from other sources and their utilization of incubatorprovided financial planning services. Perhaps those exposed to that education
were specifically more willing to consider a financing option that involved low
interest rates and little need for collateral due to their acquired knowledge of
those benefits. However, they were only significantly more willing to participate in
the PGLP option once conditions were relaxed, perhaps demonstrating their
comprehension of the burdens imposed by shared liability.
The measures of willingness to borrow from other sources were tested for
correlation with willingness to participate in a PGLP. Based on initial findings that
significant relationships existed among such pairings, a composite mean was
constructed to indicate an individual’s overall willingness to borrow. The value
was calculated as the sum of willingness to use a credit card or borrow (on a five
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point scale ranging from “very unlikely” to “very likely”) from a commercial bank,
credit union, incubator, friend or relative, and government, divided by six. Though
the specification of logistic models more accurately represents a dichotomous
dependent variable, linear probability models are simpler to interpret. Thus, both
tests were run on the two measures of willingness to participate in PGLPs. With
all four tests indicating statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, we can
accept the linear probability results suggesting that for a one point increase in
one’s willingness to borrow mean score, he/she is 39% more likely to participate
in a PGLP with joint liability and 20% more likely to participate in a PGLP with
relaxed conditions.
PGLP with
Liability

Odds Ratio Std. Error

z

P> lzl

95% Conf. Interval

Composite WTB

11.04342

7.81374

3.39 0.001 1.015068 3.788602

Constant

0.0001276

0.000348

-3.39 0.001

6.08E-07 0.026782

Table 6: Simple Logistic Regression Results – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on
Willingness to Participate in a PGLP with Shared Liability

Number of obs =
42
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.3999
Adj R-squared = 0.3849
Root MSE
= .39281
PGLP with
Liability
Coefficient Std. Error t
Composite WTB 0.3935553 0.0762224 5.16

P> ltl
95% Conf. Interval
0
0.2395041 0.547607

Constant -0.9762432 0.3058145 -3.19 0.003 -1.59E+00

-0.35817

Table 7: Linear Probability Model – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on Willingness to
Participate in a PGLP with Shared Liability
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PGLP without
Odds
Liability
Ratio Std. Error z
P> lzl
Composite WTB 2.817549 1.119694 2.61 0.009

95% Conf. Interval
1.293016 6.139585

Constant 0.0452176 0.0674555 -2.08 0.038

2.43E-03 0.841643

Table 8: Simple Logistic Regression Results – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on
Willingness to Participate in a PGLP without Shared Liability

Number of obs =
51
Prob > F
= 0.0036
R-squared = 0.1599
Adj R-squared = 0.1428
Root MSE
= .43388
PGLP without
Liability
Coefficient Std. Error t
Composite WTB 0.2020773 0.0661656 3.05
Constant -0.0949588 0.2629132 -0.36

P> ltl
95% Conf. Interval
0.004 0.0691126 0.335042
0.72

-6.23E-01 0.433385

Table 9: Linear Probability Model – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on Willingness to
Participate in a PGLP without Shared Liability

Hypothesis 3
Based

on

arguments

presented

in

the

literature,

increases

in

transportation costs and/or associated opportunity costs were expected to lead to
decreases in willingness to participate in PGLPs. This hypothesis is broken into
two pieces, with the transportation costs portion evaluated first. The expectation
was tested with Fisher’s Exact Tests to analyze the possible relationships
between willingness to participate in PGLPs (under the strict and relaxed
conditions) and average travel time to one’s incubator, the amount of times one
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meets with others from his/her incubator each month, and whether or not one is
required to attend meetings and events. None of the test results indicated
significance among these variables.
Perhaps, among this particular population, travel necessary for work and
to interact with other farmers is not considered taxing, especially when compared
to other challenges, such as the need for financial capital. After all, transportation
costs are relative to what one expects in their chosen location, not to those faced
in lesser developed countries. Additionally, transportation costs were ranked the
lowest or second lowest challenge among respondents in all regions except the
Midwest while access to financial capital was ranked the first or second greatest
challenge in all four regions, demonstrating the relativity of the perceived travel
cost constraint. Finally, the opportunity costs attached with such trips were
mostly considered minor, an issue that is now addressed in more detail.
As mentioned earlier in the text, opportunity costs associated with
interaction amongst peers is perceived to be higher in America than in lesser
developed countries. This is assumed to detract from the willingness to
participate in PGLPs, and is the final piece of hypothesis three examined in this
study. Most respondents agreed or strongly agreed that attending meetings with
other farmers, current and potential customers, and mentors were all worth their
time. There was only one “disagree” response to the question regarding mentors
and one “strongly disagree” response to the category of other farmers. Without
much variation in responses, it is difficult to know if an increase in perceived
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opportunity costs actually does detract from willingness to participate in a PGLP.
As with the transportation costs measures, no significant relationships were
found among opportunity costs measures and willingness to participate in PGLPs
under relaxed or strict conditions.
In the future, perhaps the response categories for such a question should
use a scalar range to determine the estimated amount of value associated with
such meetings. In comparison to a scale that simply measures the degree to
which one feels the meetings are worth his/her time, more variation would likely
be attained asking for individual valuations. Additionally, the opportunity costs
associated with meeting with other farmers or mentors for farming related
education or discussion may be valued more or less than one would value
meeting with the same peers for loan approvals. This question could be asked
more directly to examine that difference. Again, it seems that the challenges
posed by opportunity costs are relative to others faced by a farmer, such as the
need for networking, mentorship, financial capital, et cetera.

Additional Findings
In addition to the expected results of the study, several important findings
regarding regional differences were identified from the survey results. One
measure of interest was the relative survey response rates by region. The
sampling frame was unevenly distributed across the country, so different
numbers of responses were expected for each of the four U.S. regions. Though
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almost 40% of the 75 respondents reporting residential zip code data resided in
the West, the response rate for that region was the lowest (See Appendix C).
Based on the number of farmers associated with each incubator, the response
rate for the West was only 20%, compared with 59%, 55%, and 23% for the
Northeast, Midwest, and South respectively (See Appendix C).
This could indicate that there are greater networks, increased levels of
peer pressure, and more social cohesion among farmers in the Northeast and
Midwest. Another possibility is that the issue of microfinance appealed especially
to the farmers in those regions compared to others. Again, based on the
literature, either of these notions would lead to the expectation for increased
willingness to participate in PGLPs. However, as seen in the Fisher’s Exact Test
results below, the responses to the PGLP questions were pretty evenly split for
farmers in the South and the Midwest with Western respondents most supportive
of possible PGLP participation and Northeast participants revealing a preference
not to participate whether or not shared liability is enforced. These results may
not be statistically significant, but certainly highlight the possibility that peer
networks and interest in finance may not be enough to encourage one to
participate in a PGLP. Perhaps the abundance of farm incubators and farmers in
the West also broadens the scope one has to choose from in selecting a peer
group for a PGLP, making some more willing to participate in such a program.
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Region
PGLP
With
Liability

Midwest

Northeast

South

West

Total

No

5

7

5

3

20

Yes

4

4

5

13

26

Total

9

11

10

16

46

Fisher’s Exact= .081
Table 10: Fisher’s Exact Results – Willingness to Participate in a PGLP with Shared Liability and Region

Region
PGLP
Without
Liability

Midwest

Northeast

South

West

Total

No

6

6

3

5

20

Yes

7

5

7

20

39

Total

13

11

10

25

59

Fisher’s Exact= .159
Table 11: Fisher’s Exact Results: Willingness to Participate in a PGLP without Shared Liability and Region

The most important and noticeable regional differences and similarities
are those regarding the challenges incubator farmers face in becoming profitable
farmers. Respondents were asked to rank only their top four challenges. Due to
various perceptions and the ambiguity of assigning ranks from “greatest” to
“fourth greatest”, it was determined that designating weighted values for each
rank would be somewhat arbitrary and would likely skew the data. Thus, if an
individual ranked an element as a top four challenge (out of the 13 listed and any
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additional ones that could be written in) it received equal weight. Therefore,
Figure C-17 includes the ranked challenges for each region, with all rankings (14) receiving equal weight and the regions weighted by number of respondents. It
is apparent that land costs, equipment costs, time, and access to capital were all
reported as the most challenging aspects of profitable farming across regions.
This provides valuable insight into the services that are needed through incubator
and other farm support programs.

Limitations of the Study
It is inherently difficult to measure social capital, and as these results
reveal, the questions presented here were not exhaustive and could not capture
the full range of social capital measures. The transportation and opportunity cost
measures could have been asked in more direct ways to acquire differentiated
and more substantial results. Another challenge was the limited participation in
the Spanish version of the survey with only one respondent who was ultimately
deemed ineligible to complete it. The Spanish version was generated by a
Professor in the Clemson University languages department fluent in Spanish and
English and adept at translation. However, due to limited resources, the Spanish
version did not undergo a cognitive interview process similar to the English
version, possibly leading to unintended and limited responses.
The two questions regarding PGLP participation could have been asked
differently as well. In an effort to avoid acquiescence bias, the questions were
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asked in a non-leading way. Full descriptions of what PGLPs typically entail were
used, but the benefits were not touted as they would be by a microfinance
provider. Even with written descriptions, the concept of a PGLP was likely new to
many respondents and difficult to fully comprehend without the ability to ask
questions and receive verbal feedback. Survey questions were asked leading up
to the PGLP inquiries in an attempt to get participants thinking about this
concept. First, social capital measures were addressed to encourage
respondents to think about their relationships with their colleagues. Then, several
questions about current financing strategies one used or was likely to use were
asked to generate thoughts on available and accessible financing methods.
However, the largest number of responses to both questions was “not sure”, a
result that possibly could have been lessened with more straightforward
questions or with the ability to explain in an interview setting what was fully
meant by PGLP.
Finally, one challenge to the study design arose from the inability to
distribute the survey to all farmers or all incubator staff. Some incubator staff
preferred to send the survey and reminders to their farmers, while others
provided their participants’ contact information for direct communication with the
survey administrator. The farmers for whom contact information was obtained
received their reminders in a timely manner. However, there were no means of
knowing whether the same was true for the farmers being contacted by the
incubator staff acting as liaisons. On the contrary, those that were being
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contacted and reminded directly may not have been as likely to respond as those
who were receiving emails and possibly verbal reminders from their incubator
staff members with whom they were already familiar and may have felt more
inclined to help. Of the 72 respondents reporting an incubator zip code, 19 were
contacted directly and 53 by incubator staff. This yields a 61% response rate for
those contacted directly compared to a 23% rate for those contacted by a liaison.

Recommendations for Application
Based on the findings of this study, there are farm incubator participants
that would be willing to borrow through a Peer Group Lending Program.
However, the results are not as ubiquitous as anticipated and further research is
needed to determine if such a financing strategy could be used on a reasonable
scale. If a microfinance institution or incubator is interested in utilizing a PGLP
strategy, they should start by marketing to those individuals who are already
willing to borrow from other sources such as commercial banks, credit unions,
and friends and relatives. Additionally, those who are heavily reliant on their
fellow incubator farmers and mentors but not necessarily involved with wider
farming networks may be prime targets. More context-specific research, perhaps
at the regional, local, or incubator scale should be conducted to determine the
extent to which PGLPs can be utilized, if at all, within a particular locale.
Interviews and other means typical of market analyses are recommended.
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Even if not a plea for a PGLP strategy, the recognized need for financing
mechanisms geared towards, and readily accessible by, beginning farmers is
invaluable. Additionally, the ability for incubators to partner with other institutions
and organizations to offer subsidized land and equipment or arrangements for
the lease or sharing of such resources should likely be a major focus of
incubators in all regions. The fact that so many incubator farmers feel they are
strapped for time to devote to becoming profitable farmers may be indicative of
the fast pace of our society in general. Just as probable is the likelihood that
many beginning farmers are required to split their time between farming and
another occupation. Again, perhaps this is a cry for upfront capital investment in
such ventures, a role that incubators can help facilitate.

Conclusions and Further Research
If social cohesion and need for financing were the strong predictors they
were expected to be among farm incubatees, this would be a likely population for
whom PGLPs would work. Social capital did appear to exist rather abundantly
and need for access to financial capital was certainly recognized as a challenge,
yet the results were not overwhelming. As far as the implications this has for the
broader population of farmers, those involved in local food systems, and other
socially engaged groups, it is difficult to say. It appears that possibly smaller
niche groups such as those incubatees relying on other farmers only within their
incubators may need to be identified and targeted for PGLP participation.
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Additionally, the need to establish more sound measures of social capital that
account for contextual differences was highlighted. The unique responses to the
“similar background” measure of social capital from this survey reveal an area to
examine among farm incubator participants as well as other groups targeted for
PGLPs. Again, one can see the need for research focused on a specified target
population to fully comprehend their financial needs and social preferences. This
will likely require research methods such as interviews and case studies that
allow for more direct dialog with affected or potentially affected cohorts.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Farm Incubators in Study
Organization Name

1

City

State

Adelante Mujeres
Community CROPS (Combining Resources,
Opportunities and People for Sustainability)

Forest Grove

OR

Lincoln

NE

Simsbury

CT

4

Community Farm of Simsbury Inc.
Cultivate Kansas City and Catholic Charities of Northeast
Kansas

Kansas City

KS

5

Duluth Community Farm (Growing Farms)

Duluth

MN

6

Elma C Lomax Farm Incubator

Concord

NC

7

Farley Center Farm Incubator

Verona

WI

8

Growing Agripreneurs

Central Point

OR

9

Horn Farm Center

York

PA

10

Huerto de la Familia

Eugene

OR

11

Lowcountry Local First: Dirt Works

North Charleston

SC

12

Maverick Farms (FIG)

Valle Crucis

NC

13

Oregon State University Extension Service and
Multnomah County

Portland

OR

14 Rogue Farm Corps

Ashland

OR

15

Seattle Tilth: Farm Works

Seattle

WA

16

Sustainable Urban Agriculture Initiative

Charleston

WV

17

The Groundswell Center for Local Food & Farming

Ithaca

NY

18

The Intervale Center

Burlington

VT

19

The Seed Farm

Emmaus

PA

20

Tilian Farm Development Center

Ann Arbor

MI

21

Viva Farms

Mount Vernon

WA

2
3

Table A-1: Final List of Study Incubators and Respective Locations
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Appendix B: Fisher’s Exact Tests P-Values
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
PGLPLiab
PGLP)Total Direction
.115
.501
NA
.476
.160
NA
.246
.187
NA
.437
.102
Positive
.584
.732
NA
.035*
.043*
Positive
.251
.560
NA
.864
.658
NA
.283
.299
NA
.445
.051
Positive
.228
.455
NA
.235
.619
NA
.008**
.129
Positive
.000**
.015*
Positive
.004**
.082
Positive
.017*
.046*
Positive
.647
.234
NA
.209
.213
NA
.003**
.420
Positive

Social Capital Composite
Social Capital w/o Background
Affirmative Background Response
Reliance Within Incubator
Reliance Outside of Incubator
Strong Incubator Reliance Only
Organizational Membership
Rank of Access to Capital Challenge
Incubator Access to Financial Assistance
Incubator Small Business
Used Planning Used
Credit Card Use
Loan Use
Commercial Loan Willing?
Incubator Loan Willing?
Credit Union Loan Willing?
Friend/Relative Loan Willing?
Savings Willing?
Credit Card Use Willing?
Gov't Loan Willing?
Composite Willingness to Borrow
(commercial, credit union, friend,
incubator, government)
Travel Time
Farmer Opp. Cost
Mentor Opp. Cost
# of Meetings/Month
Attendance Required?

.075*
.419
.795
.276
.224
.245

Table B-1: P-Values for All Fisher Exact Tests
*Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.
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.124
.408
.356
.290
.741
.451

Positive
NA
NA
NA
NA

Appendix C: Survey Responses
Respondent Characteristics
Into which age category do you fall?
56 to 65 years

7

46 to 55 years

7

36 to 45 years

36

26 to 35 years

35

18 to 25 years

10
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Number of Responses

Figure C-1: Age

What is your gender?

49%

Male
Female

51%

n=79

Figure C-2: Gender

70

40

What is your racial background?
3%
1%

6%

White

7%

Black
Asian
Pacific Islander
Indian/Alaskan
Other
83%

Two or more races

n=77

Figure C-3: Race

Have you recently received or are you currently
receiving services from a farm incubator or other
farm training program?

42.1%

Current Participant
Past Participant

57.9%

n=95

Figure C-4: Participation Status
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Number of Responses

How long have you been/were you a member of your
farm incubator?
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Past Participant
Current Participant

Less than 3 3 to 6
months
months

7 months
to less
than 1 year

1 to 2
years

More than
2 years

Figure C-5: Duration of Participation

Number of Responses by State of
Residency
25
20

21

15
12

10
9
5

7

6
1

1

1

7
1

1

WI

MT

3

1

NC

SC

4

0
KS

MI

MN MO

NE

Midwest

OR

West

WA

South

Figure C-6: Responses by State and Region of Residency
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WV

PA

VT

Northeast

70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
Midwest

40.00%

West
30.00%

South

20.00%

Northeast

10.00%
0.00%
Midwest

West

South

Northeast

Figure C-7: Response Rates by Region

Incubator Characteristics
How many other farmers currently
participate/participated when you did in your farm
incubator?
Number of Incubators

10
8
6
4
2
0
0 to 5

6 to 10

11 to 20

Number of Other Participants

Figure C-8: Incubator Size
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21 to 30

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

33%

49%

55%

59%

69%

77%

84%

86%

87%

9%
Utilized
Offered

Service

Figure C-9: Services Offered by Incubators and Used by Participants

Social Capital Proxies
On average, how many times per month do you rely on
other farmers associated with/not associated with your
incubator for assistance, support, or guidance?
7
12

More than 4 times

10
15

3 to 4 times

33
37

1 to 2 times
0 times

10

Reliance Within

26

13
0

Reliance Outside

20

30

Number of Responses

Figure C-10: Reliance on Other Farmers

74

40

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following four statements?
I feel that I can easily relate to
most other farmers associated
with my incubator.

I share similar values with most
other farmers associated with my
incubator.

50

50

40

40

30

30

20

20

10

10

0

0
Strongly
Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Most other farmers associated
with my incubator face the same
challenges I do.

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Most other farmers associated
with my incubator come from a
similar background as me.

45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Strongly
Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Figure C-11: Social Capital Proxies
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Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Apart from the incubator, are you involved in any local
level organizations, groups, associations, or programs
that relate to farming (such as a Community Supported
Agriculture (CSA) group, mutual water district, producer
association, Farm to School progr

29%

Yes
No

n=84
71%

Figure C-12: Organizational Involvement

Travel Cost Measures
On average, how much time does it take you to
travel one way from home to your incubator?
25
Number of Responses

21
20
16

17
14

15
11
10
5

3

0
Less than 5
minutes

5 to 10
minutes

11 to 20
minutes

21 to 30
minutes

Figure C-13: Travel Time to Incubator

76

31 minutes More than
to 1 hour
1 hour

Number of Responses

On average, how many times a month do you
meet with others (farmers, mentors, staff, etc.)
from your incubator?
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

35

18

17
2
0 times

1 to
2 times

3 to
4 times

4

6

5 to
6 times

7 to
8 times

More than
8 times

Figure C-14: Incubator Meetings per Month

Are you required by your incubator to attend
meetings/events away from the incubator (such
as farmers markets, training classes, etc.)?

Yes
No

Figure C-15: Incubator Required Meetings
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Opportunity Cost Approximations
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following three statements?




I feel that required meetings/events with other farmers are worth my time.
I feel that required meetings/events with current or potential customers are worth
my time.
I feel that required meetings/events with mentors, staff, and trainers are worth my
time.
45
40
35
30
25

Other Farmers

20

Clients

15

Mentors, Staff

10
5
0
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Figure C-16: Opportunity Costs of Incubator Participation
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Identified Challenges

Midwest Ranked Challenges
Regulations
Competition
Water Scarcity
Access to Capital
Technical Skills
Farming Knowledge
Time
Labor Availability
Transportation Costs
Labor Costs
Equipment Costs
Land Costs
ID Markets/Sales Outlets

6%
24%
12%
59%
18%
12%
53%
12%
24%
12%
53%
59%
35%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Northeast Ranked Challenges
Regulations
Competition
Water Scarcity
Access to Capital
Technical Skills
Farming Knowledge
Time
Labor Availability
Transportation Costs
Labor Costs
Equipment Costs
Land Costs
ID Markets/Sales Outlets

13%
25%
6%
44%
19%
19%
63%
19%
6%
31%
44%
38%
25%
0%

10%

20%

79

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

South Ranked Challenges
Regulations
Competition
Water Scarcity
Access to Capital
Technical Skills
Farming Knowledge
Time
Labor Availability
Transportation Costs
Labor Costs
Equipment Costs
Land Costs
ID Markets/Sales Outlets

23%
31%
8%
62%
23%
31%
54%
8%
8%
0%
31%
54%
46%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

West Ranked Challenges
Regulations
Competition
Water Scarcity
Access to Capital
Technical Skills
Farming Knowledge
Time
Labor Availability
Transportation Costs
Labor Costs
Equipment Costs
Land Costs
ID Markets/Sales Outlets

21%
28%
10%
55%
38%
34%
41%
17%
10%
21%
34%
59%
28%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Figure C-17: Challenges by Region
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50%

60%

70%

Appendix D: Survey Flow Chart

Figure D-1: Survey Question Flow Diagram
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Appendix E: Survey
Incubator Farmers and Microfinance1
Introduction
This survey has been created to gain insights about farm incubators, farmers
associated with those incubators, and how these farmers can better be served
financially. It is divided into several sections relating to you, your incubator or
training program, challenges you face, and opportunities available to you.
The survey is intended for farmers who meet the following four criteria:
1. Must be a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (with a valid “green
card”)
2. Must be at least 18 years old
3. Must have lived in the United States for at least 1 year
4. Must currently be receiving services or have recently received services
from a farm incubator (The term "incubator" will be used throughout this
survey to mean the apprenticeship or farm training program with which
you are associated and from which you were selected to participate in
this study.)
Your answers to this survey are crucial for generating a broader base of
knowledge about successful farm incubation and the means by which farmers in
incubators are receiving services and acquire or seek to acquire financing. Your
responses are extremely important for guiding practitioners and researchers in
evaluating and creating methods by which to provide services and capital access
to farmers like you.
Should you decide to participate in this research, your responses to this survey
will be completely anonymous. The survey author will never under any
circumstances report individual responses to questions in such a way as to
identify a particular respondent.
Thank you very much for your time and interest in helping us by completing this
survey.

1

The survey presented here represents all the questions from the English version asked in present tense. See
Appendix D for a better understanding of skip logic used.

82

This first section will ask questions to ensure you are eligible to complete
this survey.
1. Into which age category do you fall? (Please select one.)
o Under 18 years
o 18 to 25 years
o 26 to 35 years
o 36 to 45 years
o 46 to 55 years
o 56 to 65 years
o 66 to 75 years
o 76 to 85 years
o 86 years and over
2. Are you a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident who has lived in the
United States for more than 1 year? (Please select one.)
o Yes
o No
3. Have you recently received or are you currently receiving services from
a farm incubator or other farm training program, and are you willing to take
this survey? (Please select one.)
o Yes I am currently receiving services from a farm incubator and am
willing to take this survey.
o Yes I have recently (in the past 5 years) received services from a
farm incubator and am willing to take this survey.
o No, I have not recently received nor am I currently receiving
services from a farm incubator.
o No, I am not willing to take this survey.
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This section will ask general questions about the incubator with which you
are affiliated and your association with that incubator.
4. How many other farmers currently participate in your farm incubator?
(Please select one.)
o 0 to 5
o 6 to 10
o 11 to 20
o 21 to 30
o 31 to 50
o 51 to 100
o More than 100
o Not sure
5. How long have you been a member of your farm incubator? (Please
select one.)
o Less than 3 months
o 3 to 6 months
o 7 months to less than 1 year
o 1 to 2 years
o More than 2 years
6. Please select whether or not each of the following services is provided
by your incubator. (Please select one option per row.)2
Training
Financial/small business planning
Access to financial assistance (ex. Loans, grants,
etc.)
Networking events
Marketing
Packaging
Distribution
Equipment
Land for lease
Land for sale

Yes

No

o
o
o

o
o
o

Not sure

o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Other service(s) offered (please specify)_______________________________

2

All questions utilizing charts were spaced evenly in the online version of the survey but were adapted to
fit the margins of this paper.
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7. Of the services your incubator provides, which one(s) have you
personally used? (Please select one option per row.)

Training
Financial/small business planning
Access to financial assistance (ex. Loans, grants,
etc.)
Networking events
Marketing
Packaging
Distribution
Equipment
Land for lease
Land for sale

Have
Used

Have Not
Used

Not
Applicable

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Other service(s) you have used (please specify)_________________________
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This section asks questions to address relationships among farmers both
associated with and not associated with your incubator.
8. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other farmers
associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or guidance?
(Please select one.)
o 0 times
o 1 to 2 times
o 3 to 4 times
o More than 4 times
o Not sure
9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following four
statements? (Please select one option per row.)
Strongly
Agree
Most other farmers
associated with my
incubator face the
same challenges I
do.
I share similar
values with most
other farmers
associated with my
incubator.
Most other farmers
associated with my
incubator come
from a similar
background as me.
I feel that I can
easily relate to
most other farmers
associated with my
incubator.

Agree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Not
Sure

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

10. Apart from the incubator, are you involved in any local level
organizations, groups, associations, or programs that relate to farming
(such as a Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) group, mutual water
district, producer association, Farm to School program, etc.)? (Please
select one.)
o Yes
o No
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11. Which organization(s) related to farming are you most engaged with?
(Please list up to three.)
1.__________________________________________
2.__________________________________________
3.__________________________________________
12. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other local
farmers not associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or
guidance? (Please select one.)
o 0 times
o 1 to 2 times
o 3 to 4 times
o More than 4 times
o Not sure
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This section asks questions regarding the travel costs you face in being an
incubator farmer.
13. On average, how much time does it take you to travel one way from
home to your incubator? (Please select one.)
o Less than 5 minutes
o 5 to 10 minutes
o 11 to 20 minutes
o 21 to 30 minutes
o 31 minutes to 1 hour
o More than 1 hour
14. On average, how many times a month do you meet with others
(farmers, mentors, staff, etc.) from your incubator? (Please select one.)
o 0 times
o 1 to 2 times
o 3 to 4 times
o 5 to 6 times
o 7 to 8 times
o More than 8 times
15. Are you required by your incubator to attend meetings/events away
from the incubator (such as farmers markets, training classes, etc.)?
(Please select one.)
o Yes
o No
o Not sure
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This section asks questions about the perceived costs of participating in
an incubator.
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following three
statements? (Please select one option per row.)
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Not
Applicable

Not
Sure

I feel that
required
meetings/ev
ents with
other
farmers are
worth my
time.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I feel that
required
meetings/ev
ents with
current or
potential
customers
are worth
my time.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I feel that
required
meetings/ev
ents with
mentors,
staff, and
trainers are
worth my
time.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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This section will ask about your farming expectations after incubator
participation.
17. Do you expect to produce goods for sale to others after you complete
your incubator experience?
o Yes
o No
o Not sure
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This section addresses challenges you perceive in becoming a profitable
farmer.
18. Please rank the top four challenges you currently face in becoming a
profitable farmer in your area. (Please select one option per column.)
Greatest
Challenge

2nd Greatest
Challenge

3rd Greatest
Challenge

4th Greatest
Challenge

Transportation
costs
Land costs
Time
Farming
knowledge
Labor costs
Labor availability

o

o

o

o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

Technical skills
Identifying
marketing/sales
outlets
Access to capital

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o

o

o

o

Equipment costs

o

o

o

o

Water scarcity
Competition
Regulations

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Other challenge (please specify) ____________________________________
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This section asks questions about how you acquire or seek to acquire
financial resources for your farming business.
19. Not including credit card use, have you taken out any loans to secure
resources for your farming business in the past year? (Please select one.)
o Yes
o No
o Not sure
20. Considering these loan(s) you received over the past year for your
farming business (from banks, credit unions, family members, etc.), in
what range would you estimate the total amount falls? Please do not
include credit card usage. (Please select one.)
o Less than $5,000
o $5,000 to $9,999
o $10,000 to $19,999
o $20,000 to $29,999
o $30,000 to $35,000
o More than $35,000
21. Have you used a credit card to secure resources for your farming
business in the past year? (Please select one.)
o Yes
o No
o Not sure
22. Approximately how much have you charged to your card(s) in the past
year? Please only consider charges for acquiring resources for your
farming business. (Please select one.)
o Less than $1,000
o $1,000 to $2,499
o $2,500 to $4,999
o $5,000 to $10,000
o Greater than $10,000
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23. Currently, how likely or unlikely are you to use the following resources
to obtain capital for your farming business? (Please select one option per
row.)
Very
Likely
Credit card
Credit union
loan
Commercial
bank loan
Loan from a
friend or relative
Savings
Government
loan (ex.
Beginning
Farmer and
Rancher loans)

Somewhat
Likely

Neither
Likely nor
Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Very
Unlikely

Not
Sure

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

Other resource(s) (please specify)___________________________________
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This section asks questions about possible participation in a microfinance
peer group lending program.
The definitions provided below will help in answering the questions in this
section.
Definitions
Microfinance: providing very small loans, referred to as microloans, (typically
$35,000 or less) to individuals for the purpose of creating or expanding
businesses.
Peer Group Lending Program (PGLP): a microfinance mechanism in which
clients form groups with several other people of their choice. The group members
are then responsible for monitoring and approving each other’s loans in regularly
held meetings. Members are also held accountable for repayment of each other’s
loans, thus encouraging selection of group members that are willing and likely
able to repay their loans. If all the members of the group are meeting their
repayment obligations, the loan process continues. Otherwise, no member of the
group is eligible for future loans. This mechanism spreads risk among clients and
lenders, thus reducing the cost of making microloans for lending institutions and
allowing for lower interest rates than would typically be available from
commercial lenders.
24. Thinking of several colleagues whom you trust, would you be willing to
form a peer group and participate in a PGLP as defined above, in which
you would all be responsible for repayment of each other's loans, thus
reducing the interest rates available to you?
o Yes
o No
o Not Sure
25. Would you be more willing to participate in a PGLP if shared liability
for each other's loans was not enforced, thus slightly reducing interest
rates available to you, but not as much as in the previous scenario of a
traditional PGLP?
o Very much more willing
o Somewhat more willing
o Slightly more willing
o Not at all more willing
o Not sure
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26. What is the primary reason you would consider participating in a
PGLP? (Please select one.)
o Group networking and support
o Ease of loan approval
o No need for collateral
o Low interest rates
Other (please specify) ___________________________
27. What is the primary reason you would consider participating in a
PGLP? (Please select one.)
o Group networking and support
o Ease of loan approval
o No need for collateral
o Low interest rates
o Shared risk
Other (please specify)_________________________________
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This final section will ask some basic demographic questions for
comparison to the larger farming population.
28. What is your gender?
o Female
o Male
29. In what country were you born?
Country: ____________________________________
30. What is your racial background? (Please select all that apply.)
o White
o Black or African American
o Asian
o Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Other
31. Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent? (Please select one.)
o Yes, Hispanic or Latino
o No, not Hispanic or Latino
32. In what ZIP code is your primary residence located? (Please enter 5digit ZIP code.)
ZIP Code: ________________
33. In what ZIP code is the main training site of your incubator located?
(Please enter 5-digit ZIP code.)
ZIP Code: ________________

96

Ineligibility
Unfortunately, you are not eligible to complete this questionnaire. Thank you for
your time and interest.
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Thank You
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey.
Once you hit the "Done" button, your answers will be submitted.
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